Denver Law Review
Volume 85

Issue 1

Article 3

January 2007

Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change
Douglas A. Berman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change , 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 7 (2007).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

RITA, REASONED SENTENCING, AND RESISTANCE TO
CHANGE
DOUGLAS A. BERMAN

t

INTRODUCTION

Federal judges have struggled mightily to comprehend the meaning
and impact of the Supreme Court's landmark sentencing decision in
United States v. Booker.1 In Booker, the Court remedied Sixth Amendment problems with judicial fact-finding under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines by making the Guidelines "effectively advisory" and fashioned a new "reasonableness" standard for appellate review of sentences.2 But, as documented by conflicting lower court opinions, few
judges or practitioners could be sure whether the Booker remedy should
significantly change or only slightly alter the operational realities of the
federal sentencing system.3
The Supreme Court seemed poised to provide needed guidance on
Booker's meaning and application when, in late 2006, the Court granted
certiorari in Claiborne v. United States4 and Rita v. United States.5 In
Claiborne,the Court was to examine circuit court approaches to judging
the reasonableness of below-guideline sentences imposed by district
courts; in Rita, the Court was to examine approaches being used to judge
within-guideline sentences. But the sudden death of petitioner Mario
Claiborne required the Supreme Court to vacate the Claiborne case after
oral argument.6 The Court took up two new cases, Kimbrough v. United
States7 and Gall v. United States,8 in order to address below-guideline
sentences, but they are not to be heard until the Court's October 2007
Term.

t
William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State
University; A.B., Princeton University, 1990; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993.
1.

543 U.S. 220 (2005).

2.

Id. at 245-46, 260-65.

3.

See generally NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY ch.3 (2d ed.

2007) (reviewing post-Booker uncertainties).
4.

439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-

5618).
5.
177 Fed. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006)
(No. 06-5754).
6.
439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007).
7.
174 Fed. App'x 798 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007)
(No. 06-6330).
8.
446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 067949).
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Left only with a within-guideline case to resolve, the Justices in
Rita v. United States9 issued four opinions that raise more questions than
they answered. The opinions in Rita revealed not only that the Court is
still struggling with its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but also that the
Justices have divergent views on the many other dynamic issues raised
by the Booker remedy of an advisory guideline system.
As explained in Part I below, the Booker remedy transformed a constitutional debate into a multi-dimensional cacophony of sentencing issues that Rita could only begin to address. Moreover, as detailed in Part
II, though Rita does answer a few key post-Booker questions, the opinions in Rita have passages that present new puzzles for anyone trying to
sort through the post-Booker world of federal sentencing. Finally, as
discussed in Part III, Rita and lower courts' early reactions to the decision ultimately reveal, yet again, that dramatic legal changes face resistance from sentencing actors who become acclimated to the status quo.
Indeed, the history of modem federal sentencing reforms demonstrates
that changes in legal doctrines become revolutionary only when they
ultimately transform the legal cultures in which these doctrines operate.
This lesson should be heeded not only by the Supreme Court as it considers another set of sentencing cases, but also by all would-be legal reformers in the field of sentencing and beyond.
I. THE MANY ISSUES RAISED-BUT NOT RESOLVED-BY BOOKER
Though implicating other issues,' ° the Supreme Court's numerous
divided sentencing rulings over the last decade-including the merits
opinion in Booker-have been principally focused on the meaning and
application of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision." But the remedial opinion in Booker converted a constitutional debate into a confusing battle royale over a wide array of modem federal sentencing laws and
practices. 12 Specifically, Booker's advisory guideline remedy brought at
least six dynamic and challenging legal issues into play for lower courts
9.
127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
10.
In another article, I have highlighted that the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment
rulings implicate and reflect, both expressly and implicitly, an array of constitutional provisions and
principles beyond the right to a jury trial. See Douglas A. Berman, Beyond Blakely and Booker:
Pondering Modem Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 653, 653 (2005); see also
Frank 0. Bowman, III, Function Over Formalism: A Provisional Theory of the Constitutional Law
of Crime andPunishment, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 1, 5-12 (2004) (assailing the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence while suggesting new approaches to interpretations of the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments to address sentencing issues).
11.
See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
12.
The start of Justice Souter's dissent in Rita captures this reality in one simple sentence:
"Applying the Sixth Amendment to current sentencing law has gotten complicated, and someone
coming cold to this case might wonder how we reached this point." Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2484 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
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involved in sentencing decision making. Even an abridged account of
these multiple and often cross-cutting legal issues raised-but not resolved-by the Booker remedy highlights why so much doctrinal and
practical uncertainty has followed in the wake of the Supreme Court's
creation of an advisory federal guideline sentencing system.
A. Issue #1: The Import of ConstitutionalJurisprudence
The merits ruling in Booker declared unconstitutional judicial factfinding to enhance sentencing ranges within a mandatory guideline system.1 3 But, as many have noted, because judges still engage in extensive
judicial fact-finding within an advisory guideline scheme, the Booker
remedy arguably undermines the very jury trial concerns that seemed to
animate the Court's modem Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 14 Consequently, as a matter of constitutional law after Booker, lower courts have
struggled to figure out if the Sixth Amendment is to have real substantive
bite or is only to be given lip-service in the application of an advisory
guideline system.
B. Issue #2: The Meaning of Statutory Provisions
The specific remedy adopted in Booker was purportedly driven by
statutory law: Justice Breyer emphasized Congress's intent in the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) to justify making the Guidelines advisory, 5
and the Booker remedy championed the SRA's detailed sentencing instructions in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as still controlling law for both district
and circuit judges.16 But the Booker remedy said very little about how
lower courts are to assess and balance the numerous (and vague) sentencing factors set out in § 3553(a), and Booker never even mentioned
§ 3553(a)'s command that courts "impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of punishment set
out by Congress.' 7 Consequently, as a matter of statutory law after
Booker, lower courts have struggled to give effect to the express text of
the SRA and the perceived goals of Congress in the application of an
advisory guideline system.

13.
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-59.
14.
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 679-80
(2006); see also Kevin R. Rcitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and ConstitutionalLaw at
Cross-Purposes,105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1113 (2005).

15.
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 249-58.
16.
See id. at 259-61, 268-70.
17.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (2007); see also Posting of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law
and Policy Blog, The Power of Parsimony (and Justice Breyer's Notable Omission),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-andjpolicy/2005/01/the_powerofpa.html (Jan. 12,
2005, 08:54 PM).
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C. Issue #3: The Force ofAdministrative Regulations
The Booker remedy extolled the Guidelines and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's efforts to promote "better sentencing practices,"1 8 and
stressed that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) still requires judges to "consider" the
Guidelines and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's policy statements. 19
In turn, many post-Booker lower court rulings emphasize the importance
and value of the Guidelines as the considered work of an expert agency
seeking to achieve congressional sentencing goals. 20 But, even when
lauding the Guidelines, lower courts acknowledge that the Commission's
Guidelines cannot be given binding force without creating the constitutional problems that led to the Booker ruling.2 1 Moreover, the Commission's own research and analysis has spotlighted that certain Guidelines-such as the hundred-to-one ratio in calculating crack-to-powder
cocaine sentences, and the severe career-offender enhancementundermine the sentencing goals set forth by Congress in the SRA.22
Consequently, as a matter of administrative law after Booker, lower
courts have struggled to determine exactly how much emphasis can and
should be given to the Guidelines and the Sentencing Commission's
other work product in the application of an advisory guideline system.
D. Issue #4: The Development of Common Law Standards
The Booker remedy's conversion of the Guidelines to be "effectively advisory" and its creation of a new reasonableness standard of
appellate review was ultimately a tour-de-force of judicial lawmaking.
Justice Breyer crafted this remedy in Booker out of whole cloth with only
a nod to applicable constitutional, statutory and administrative laws.
Perhaps inspired (or even required) by Booker's creation of a new common-law federal sentencing framework, lower courts have developed
common-law standards for sorting through various recurring post-Booker
issues; the most prominent such creation is the appellate "presumption of
reasonableness" for within-guideline sentences, which was at issue in
Rita.23 But, because common-law doctrines in the federal criminal justice system are not common, the legal foundation and the evolution of
post-Booker judge-made sentencing doctrines have been confounding
18.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 263-65.
19. Id.at 259-60.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ministrio-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2006); United
States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006).
21.
See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 664-65 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir.
2006).
22.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM Is ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF

SENTENCING REFORM 131-34 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/Chap4.pdf, see also
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING

POLICY passim (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/rcongress/02crack/2002crackrpt.htm.
23.
Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007).
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and sometimes convoluted. Consequently, as a matter of common law
after Booker, lower courts have struggled to decide whether and how to
craft new sentencing doctrines in the application of an advisory guideline
system.
E. Issue #5: The Scope of JudicialSentencing Discretion
Congress passed the SRA to limit and guide, but not eliminate, the
discretion that district judges had traditionally exercised at sentencing.24
Thus, long before the Supreme Court's modem Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the scope of judicial discretion within the federal guideline
sentencing system was a fundamental concern and a matter of extensive
debate.2 5 Moreover, though the Supreme Court in its Sixth Amendment
rulings has sought to distinguish mandatory judicial fact-finding from
traditional judicial discretion, these issues are readily conflated because
both relate to judges' overall power and authority at sentencing. The
Booker decision further clouded these issues by declaring unconstitutional certain judicial fact-finding in a mandatory guideline system, but
then crafting a remedy which permits similar fact-finding within a sentencing system that enhances traditional judicial discretion. Consequently, when seeking to define the scope of judicial sentencing discretion after Booker, lower courts have struggled to figure out whether they
should embrace and encourage further expansion of judicial sentencing
discretion or instead should now try to place whatever limits on this discretion that the Constitution might permit in the application of an advisory guideline system.26

24.
See Douglas A. Berman, Balancedand Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence
that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 37-41 (2000)
(discussing the SRA's interest in achieving a healthy balance of judicial sentencing discretion).
Notably, roughly a decade after the SRA's enactment and a decade before Booker, a unanimous
Supreme Court in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), asserted that Congress in the SRA
sought to ensure "that district courts retain much of their traditional sentencing discretion" by giving
judges statutory authority to depart from the Guidelines. Id. at 97. As commentators have noted,
however, this assertion may have been more wishful thinking than a statement of actual fact by the
Court. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman & Mark Harris, The Koon Case: Departuresand Discretion,9
FED. SENT'G REP. 4 (1996) (questioning the Supreme Court's various assertions in Koon about
judicial sentencing discretion).
25. See generally Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Charles J. Ogletree, The
Death of Discretion? Reflections on the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938,
1944 (1988).
26. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year ofJubilee.. . or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations about the Operationof the FederalSentencing System after Booker, 43 Hous. L. REV.
279 (2006); Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle? JudicialSentencing DiscretionRevived
in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615, 616 (2006); Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal
JudicialDiscretion in CriminalSentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693 (2005).
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F. Issue #6: The Reality of Sentencing Outcomes (andReactions
Thereto)
Legal doctrines and highfalutin constitutional and sentencing theory
notwithstanding, the rubber always hits the road in the criminal justice
system, for defendants and society, in terms of concrete sentencing outcomes. Debates over sentencing law, policy, and practice typically take
place in the shadow of concerns about particular substantive offenses and
particular individual offenders; principle necessarily gives way to outcome-oriented pragmatism when judges and others have to make casespecific sentencing choices. Consequently, within any sentencing structure, lower courts will always struggle to decide what is a fair, effective,
and appropriate sentencing outcome for a particular defendant. Further,
as the Booker opinion itself emphasized, Congress always retains authority to revise or restructure the basic framework and ground rules of federal sentencing law and procedure. 27 In the period after Booker, sentencing decisions were being made in the shadow of concerns about how
Congress might respond to certain outcomes or particular sentencing
patterns. Consequently, when imposing sentences after Booker, lower
courts have struggled to balance case-specific justice and broader system-wide interests in the application of an advisory guideline system.
This brief taxonomy of six dynamic and challenging issues that the
Booker remedy brought into play for lower courts does not comprehensively canvass all the important policy concerns and legal questions
raised by Booker and the major rulings that preceded it. 28 Nevertheless,
this taxonomy still highlights how the Booker remedy transformed what
had primarily been a constitutional debate into a cacophony of sentencing issues that no single subsequent ruling could seriously hope to resolve. Moreover, as detailed in the next Part, though Rita does usefully
illuminate a few key post-Booker issues, mysterious passages in all the
Rita opinions present new puzzles for those seeking greater clarity about
the application of an advisory guideline system after Booker.
II. WHAT

RITA CLEARS UP AND WHAT RITA CONFOUNDS

Though many hoped that Rita would help straighten out
post-Booker sentencing realities, the wide array of challenging issues
raised by the Booker remedy ensured that Rita could not conclusively
settle exactly how advisory guidelines in the federal system are to operate. Moreover, because the opinions in Rita revealed that the Court is
fractured on an array of constitutional and non-constitutional sentencing
27.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
28. See generally Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37 (2006) (discussing broader theoretical issues raised by the Supreme Court's
modem sentencing rulings); Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1; Berman, supra note 10 (discussing broader constitutional concerns raised by the Supreme Court's modem sentencing rulings).
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issues, perhaps the Justices should be lauded for delivering an opinion in
Rita that settles at least a few post-Booker issues. Nevertheless, as the
next two sections highlight, a close review of the Rita opinions can leave
a reader feeling more befuddled than enlightened.
A. What Seems ClearAfter Rita
A few aspects of constitutional jurisprudence and post-Booker sentencing realities are settled by Rita. For example, the Court expressly
held that the Sixth Amendment does not preclude a circuit court from
applying a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing a withinguideline sentence imposed by the district court.29 Critically, though,
such a presumption apparently is not an essential aspect of the common
law of post-Booker sentencing: none of the opinions in Rita hold or even
suggest that those circuits which have resisted this presumption ought
now to adopt it. Nevertheless, by extensively praising the U.S. Sentencing Commission's "serious, sometimes controversial, effort to carry out"
congressional sentencing reform goals, 30 the majority opinion in Rita
suggests that adopting the presumption is a wise circuit choice.
The majority opinion in Rita further clarifies what this (permissible
but not essential) presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline
sentences is not: (1) it is "not binding"; 3' (2) it "does not, like a
trial-related evidentiary presumption, insist that one side, or the other,
shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or proof lest they lose their
case"; 32 and (3) it does not "reflect strong judicial deference of the kind
that leads appeals courts to grant greater factfinding leeway to an expert
agency than to a district judge." 33 Though before Rita no circuit clearly
approached the presumption in these now verboten ways, the Supreme
Court's numerous assertions about what the presumption isn't apparently
are meant to indicate that the presumption must be genuinely rebuttable.34
Fortunately, the majority opinion does provide some helpful guidance about what the presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline
sentences actually is: "the presumption before us is an appellate court
36
presumption," 35 which means that it "applies only on appellate review,"
which further means that at initial sentencing a district court "does not
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-66 (2007).
Id. at 2463-65.
Id. at 2463.
Id.
Id.

34. See id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his Rita concurrence, Justice Stevens cites to
the majority's (anti-)explanatory statements about the presumption of reasonableness to support his
assertion that "the Court acknowledges moreover [that] presumptively reasonable does not mean
always reasonable; the presumption, of course, must be genuinely rebuttable." Id. (emphasis in
original).
35.
Id. at 2465.
36. Id.
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enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the guideline sentence
should apply., 37 This point about the presumption's inapplicability at
initial sentencing is perhaps the most significant and consequential aspect of the Rita decision. More than a few district courts, sometimes on
their own and sometimes influenced by the adoption of a presumption of
reasonableness in their circuits, have indicated to defendants and litigants
that they planned to impose a within-guideline sentence unless and until
a party presented a potent justification for a non-guideline sentence.38
Rita suggests that it is inappropriate-and, one would think, reversible
error-for a district judge to look to the Guidelines as providing a default
sentencing range at initial sentencing.
The majority opinion in Rita also clarifies that some doctrines are
off-limits to circuit courts after Booker. The opinion explains that the
"fact that we permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness" for certain types of sentences. 39 The opinion further notes
that "[e]ven the Government concedes that appellate courts may not presume that every variance from the advisory Guidelines is unreasonable." 40 Circuits that had adopted a presumption of reasonableness before Rita typically made similar points; 4 1 but the frequent reversal of
below-guideline sentences could justify a conclusion that some circuits
have been applying, de facto if not de jure, a presumption of unreasonableness when reviewing sentences imposed below the applicable guideline range.42
Last but not least, the majority opinion in Rita discusses at length
the procedures that district courts apparently should follow when imposing sentences within an advisory guideline system after Booker. This
nuanced (and dicta-filled) treatment of post-Booker sentencing practices
indicates that a "sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally
begin by considering the presentence report and its interpretation of the
Guidelines,"4 3 and then "may hear arguments by prosecution or defense
that the Guidelines sentence should not apply." 44 This process, suggests
the Rita Court, "subjects the defendant's sentence to the thorough adver37.
Id.
38.
See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005); see also
United States v. Ross, No. 07-1215, 2007 WL 2593509 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 2007) (vacating sentence
and remanding for resentencing because "it appears from the record that the district court improperly
applied a presumption of reasonableness for a within-guidelines sentence").
39.
Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2467.
40. Id.
41.
See, e.g., United States v. Matheny, 450 F.3d 633, 642 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Howard, 454 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1239
(10th Cir. 2006).
Of course, the appellate approach to below-guideline sentences was to be examined in the
42.
dismissed Claibornecase, and will be addressed by the Court in the now-pending Kimbrough and
Gall cases. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
43. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
44. Id.
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sarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure, ' 5 and enables a district judge to exercise "his reasoned sentencing judgment, resting upon an effort to filter the Guidelines' general advice through
§ 3553(a)'s list of factors." 6
Upon reaching a sentencing decision, explains the Rita majority,
"[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough [sentencing reasons] to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority. '47 A decision to impose a within-guideline sentence "will not
necessarily require lengthy explanation," 48 although when a party presents a viable argument for a different sentence "the judge will normally
...explain why he has rejected those arguments., 4 9 And when deciding
to impose "a sentence
outside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why
'5 °
so.
done
has
he
In this discussion of the sentencing process, the Rita majority
stresses that "[j]udicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a
judge's use of reason underlies the public's trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with
the assurance that creates that trust."'5 1 But the Court further indicates
that the "appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when
to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances .... Sometimes the
circumstances will call for a52brief explanation; sometimes they will call
for a lengthier explanation."
B. What Seems More Puzzling After Rita
The extensive dicta in Rita-about the Guidelines in general and
about the post-Booker sentencing process in particular-suggests that the
Supreme Court was genuinely eager to provide more guidance to lower
courts about how they should administer an advisory federal guideline
sentencing system. Unfortunately, as detailed below, various passages
throughout the Rita opinions raise new questions about the array of federal sentencing issues that the Booker remedy stirred up.
1. Issue #1: The Import of Constitutional Jurisprudence
Though Rita settles that there are no constitutional problems with
the general application of an appellate presumption of reasonableness,
Justice Scalia reads the majority opinion as leaving open the prospect of
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id
Id. at 2469.
Id.at 2468.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
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defendants raising (and sometimes succeeding with) "as-applied Sixth
Amendment challenges" to certain within-guideline sentences. 3 But
neither Justice Scalia's concurrence nor any other opinion in Rita provides any guidance as to exactly when a particular within-guideline sentence based on judicial fact-finding could or would transgress the Sixth
Amendment. 4 Consequently, as a matter of constitutional law after Rita,
lower courts still cannot be sure if the Sixth Amendment is to have some
real substantive bite or is only to be given lip-service in the application
of an advisory guideline system.
2. Issue #2: The Meaning of Statutory Provisions
The majority opinion in Rita says surprisingly little about the express text of § 3553(a), even though the Court reaffirms Booker's determination that this statutory provision now controls federal sentencing
decision making. Moreover, what little the majority opinion does say
about § 3553(a) is more mysterious than meaningful: the Court says that
a district judge should make "an effort to filter the Guidelines' general
advice through § 3553(a)'s list of factors, 55 but it never explains what
this means in practical terms; the Court indicates a party can argue that a
"Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, 5 6 but it never explains when this type of argument could support
or even require a sentence outside the Guidelines. Justice Stevens' concurrence in Rita further asserts "that § 3553(a) authorizes the sentencing
judge to consider" many individual characteristics that "are not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines, 5 7 but he too fails to articulate with
particularity what this entails for sentencing decision making by district
and circuit judges. Consequently, as a matter of statutory law after Rita,
lower courts still cannot be confident about how they are supposed to
give effect to the express text of the SRA and the perceived goals of
Congress in the application of an advisory guideline system.

53.
Id.at 2479 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54. Justice Scalia's opinion in Rita seems to suggest that a within-guideline sentence depending too much on judicially found facts would trigger "as-applied" Sixth Amendment concerns even
within an advisory guideline scheme. See id.But Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Blakely
argued for a "bright-line" approach to what types of judicial fact-finding violates the Sixth Amendment because of the "need to give intelligible content to the right ofjury trial." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-08 (2004). It is ironic and surprising that Justice Scalia in Rita now seems to
be advocating a vague, judicial-administered, not-yet-very-intelligible standard for applying the
Sixth Amendment in the context of advisory guideline systems.
55.
Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2469.
56. Id.at 2465; see also id. at 2468 (discussing the possibility of a litigant "contest[ing] the
Guidelines sentence generally under [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)"); id at 2470 (asserting that the defendant failed to press in the lower courts the "claim that the Guidelines sentence is not reasonable
under § 3553(a) because it expressly declines to consider various personal characteristics of the
defendant").
57. Id.at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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3. Issue #3: The Force of Administrative Regulations
The majority opinion in Rita lauds the U.S. Sentencing Commission's construction of "a set of Guidelines that seek to embody the
§ 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice., 58 Yet the
same opinion also suggests that there may be cases-perhaps many
cases-in which a "Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect §
3553(a) considerations. 59 Similarly, Justice Stevens' concurrence asserts a district court's sentencing choice merits "added respect" 60 when
consistent with the Guidelines, even though his opinion stresses that the
6
Court's work in Rita clarifies that "the Guidelines are truly advisory." '
Consequently, as a matter of administrative law after Rita, lower courts
still cannot be confident about exactly how much emphasis can and
should be given to the Guidelines in the application of an advisory guideline system.
4. Issue #4: The Development of Common Law Standards
As noted before, the Court in Rita approved the circuit courts' creation of a presumption of reasonableness for reviewing within-guideline
sentences,62 but it did not command or even directly encourage all the
circuits to adopt this presumption. Meanwhile, Justice Stevens' concurrence emphasizes that the presumption "must be genuinely rebuttable, 6 3
but he provides no insights or suggestions about when and how the presumption is to be rebutted. Relatedly, the majority seems untroubled
with the prospect that the "presumption will encourage sentencing judges
to impose Guidelines sentences," 64 while the opinions of both Justice
Stevens and Justice Souter express great concern with the creation of
appellate doctrines that could unduly push district judges toward following the Guidelines. Moreover, when discussing judicial sentencing practices, the Rita majority suggests that cases raising "conceptually simple"
issues may generally require only a "brief' statement of reasons; 65 but
the Court does not indicate how lower courts should determine or police
when conceptually challenging issues require "the judge to write more
extensively.",66 Consequently, as a matter of common law after Rita,
lower courts cannot be sure whether and how they should craft commonlaw sentencing doctrines in the application of an advisory guideline system.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 2464.
Id. at 2465; see also id. at 2468, 2470.
Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
See id. at 2465-66 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2469 (majority opinion).
Id.
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5. Issue #5: The Scope of Judicial Sentencing Discretion
The majority opinion in Rita devotes far more energy to extolling
the Guidelines and the pursuit of "increased uniformity" than to promoting discretionary judgments by district courts. 6 7 Nevertheless, the Rita
Court does suggest the importance of "the sentencing court's judgment
as to what is an appropriate sentence for a given offender., 68 Meanwhile, Justice Stevens' concurrence exalts the unique information and
insights of district courts and the importance of an appellate court defer69
ring to a district court's "individualized sentencing determination."
Indeed, Justice Stevens' final sentence stresses "the importance of paying
70
appropriate respect to the exercise of a sentencing judge's discretion.,
Consequently, when seeking to define the scope of judicial sentencing
discretion after Rita, lower courts still cannot be sure if they should embrace further expansion of judicial sentencing discretion or seek to judicially regulate this discretion in the application of an advisory guideline
system.
6. Issue #6: The Reality of Sentencing Outcomes (and Reactions
Thereto)
Perhaps because the Court focused on broader post-Booker considerations, its brief discussion of Victor Rita's specific sentencing claims
had the feel of an afterthought. The Supreme Court can simply deny
review of the thousands of sentences appealed in the federal system
every year, and thus the Justices in Rita perhaps unsurprisingly invested
great energy and devoted nearly all their opinions to an extended discussion of system-wide sentencing concerns. Nevertheless, neither district
courts nor circuit courts have the luxury of ignoring case-specific realities at sentencing: district judges have an obligation to unpack and assess
the factual and legal issues raised by each individual case; circuit judges
must be concerned with examining and correcting claimed errors in the
appeal at hand before worrying about developing legal standards for future cases. Consequently, when deciding upon specific sentencing outcomes after Rita, lower courts are still faced with the special challenges
of balancing case-specific justice and broader system-wide interests in
the application of an advisory guideline system.7'
This brief post-Rita review of six dynamic and challenging issues
that the Booker remedy brought into play for lower courts surely has the
feel, in the memorable words of Yogi Berra, of dj vu all over again.
Though Rita does usefully illuminate a few key post-Booker issues, it
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
balancing

See id.
at 2463-67.
Id.at 2465.
Id.at 2472 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.at 2474.
Cf Jeffrey S. Sutton, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 79, 79-81 (2007) (explaining dilernma of
individual sentencing and system-wide consistency).
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does not even begin to quell the cacophony of sentencing issues that have
necessarily arisen in Booker's wake as lower courts try to make sense of
an advisory federal guideline sentencing system. In short, doctrinal mysteries still abound after Rita. And yet, as the concluding Part of this article explains, the post-Rita sentencing landscape may be more predictable
than this Part's legal analysis might suggest.

III. THE PERSISTENCE OF RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
(A/K/A THE NEED TO CHANGE PERSPECTIVES ALONG WITH DOCTRINE)
Part I highlighted the many challenging issues raised-but not resolved-by the Booker remedy, and Part II highlighted that these issues
remain muzzy after Rita. Nevertheless, doctrinal and practical uncertainties notwithstanding, the federal sentencing system keeps humming
along, sentencing more than 5000 federal defendants each and every
month.7 2 Moreover, and more importantly, even a cursory review of
federal sentencing realities in lower courts after Booker and now after
Rita reveals a sentencing system that is still extraordinarily similar in
operation and appearance to the federal sentencing system before Booker
and Rita.
Lower courts' general responses to Booker and their early reactions
to Rita document, yet again, that dramatic legal changes face resistance
from sentencing actors who have become acclimated to the status quo.
Indeed, as highlighted briefly below, the history of modem federal sentencing reforms demonstrates that changes in legal doctrines have become revolutionary only when they ultimately transformed the legal cultures in which these doctrines operate. This is a broad lesson that should
be heeded not only by the Supreme Court as it considers another set of
sentencing cases, but also by all would-be legal reformers in the field of
sentencing and beyond.
A. The (Inevitable?)History of Resistance to Sentencing Change
Social scientists have long noted the realities (and potential problems) of status quo biases-that is, the natural tendency of people to
generally prefer things to stay relatively the same.73 Legal theorists have
come to recognize the import and impact of these biases in the arena of
legal reform.74 Significantly, the modem history of federal sentencing

72.
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
(2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm.
73.
See William F. Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988); see also Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991).
74. See generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1119 (2006); Raquel
Fernandez & Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 1146 (1991)
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reforms provides interesting and diverse examples of status quo biases at
work in many different legal settings.
Status quo biases were evident in the early development of modem
sentencing reforms. Many leading academics, policy advocates, and
politicians were talking serious about the need for federal sentencing
reforms by the mid-1970s.75 But, surely influenced by a kind of status
quo bias, Congress took nearly a decade to finally pass the landmark
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.76 That Act created the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to develop guidelines for federal sentencing. But, surely
influenced by a kind of status quo bias, that Commission was unable to
chart a new conceptual path for federal sentencing, and ultimately developed a set of guidelines that were premised largely on past sentencing
practices.77 These Guidelines for federal sentencing were due to take
effect in 1987. But, surely influenced by a kind of status quo bias, many
lower federal courts initially declared the federal sentencing Guidelines
unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable.7 8 Tellingly, the Supreme
Court in Mistretta v. United States79 ultimately upheld the constitutionality of aspects of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 by asserting, somewhat inaccurately, that the SRA really did not radically change the status
quo traditions of the federal sentencing system.8 °
Since the Guidelines were in place and received an initial constitutional blessing from the Supreme Court, status quo biases have been evident in the application and continued development of modem sentencing
reforms. Both the U.S. Sentencing Commission and federal judges have
focused virtually all their sentencing decision making on the basic structure and particularized regulations set forth in the Guidelines. Despite
long-standing and widespread criticisms of the Guidelines from federal

75.
See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER ix (1973);
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 3 (1976); Criminal Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 JUDICATURE 208,
209 (1976); Edward M. Kennedy, Forewardto PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM xiii (1977); Norval Morris, Towards PrincipledSentencing, 37
MD. L. REV. 267, 267 (1977).

76.

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 991

(2007)); see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 229 (1993) (reviewing the

long congressional debates over the process of enacting a federal sentencing reform bill).
See Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
77.
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 24 (1988) (discussing the challenges and choices sur-

rounding the development of the initial Guidelines).
78.

See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 73-74 (1996) (discussing arguments made

against the SRA's constitutionality). Professor Michael Tonry sensibly suggests that many of these
rulings, "though necessarily couched in constitutional terms... [revealed] judges' deep antipathy to
the guidelines themselves." Id. at 73.
79.

488 U.S. 361 (1989).

80. Id. at 406-08; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97 (1996) (asserting curiously
that Congress in the SRA sought to ensure "that district courts retain much of their traditional sentencing discretion" by giving judges statutory authority to depart from the Guidelines).
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judges, academics, defense attorneys, and even many prosecutors,8 ' the
U.S. Sentencing Commission has never seriously considered any sizeable
or systemic change to the Guidelines' structure or basic operations.
Similarly, even though many federal judges have often vocally complained about the Guidelines, the federal judiciary had generally failed to
contribute to the development of federal sentencing law within a guideline system.82 Moreover, though the SRA radically transformed the nature, inputs, and import of the traditional sentencing process, nearly all
courts have continued to rely upon informal procedures for sentencing
decision making under the Guidelines, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed
pre-reform
holdings about defendants' limited procedural rights at sen3
tencing.8
Of course, the Booker decision seemed to mark an extraordinary
break from the stories of status quo bias in the federal sentencing system.
Despite nearly two decades of judicial fact-finding under mandatory
Guidelines, the Supreme Court in Booker concluded that the system violated the Sixth Amendment and it crafted a novel and unexpected set of
sentencing standards for both district courts and circuit courts. 8 4 And
yet, lower court opinions and cumulative post-Booker data reveal that the
Booker remedy has been applied, especially by circuit courts, to preserve
the pre-Booker status quo. 5 Soon after Booker, circuit courts were quick
to hold that district judges still must properly calculate guideline sentencing ranges and must still provide a reasoned justification for any decision
to deviate from the Guidelines. 6 Other players in the federal sentencing
system also appeared highly disinclined to change their standard operating procedures in response to Booker: probation officers kept preparing
presentence reports relying on the same sources of information as before
Booker; prosecutors and defendants kept on dickering over guideline
application issues in plea negotiations and before sentencing courts; dis81.
See Berman, supra note 28, at 42-62 (detailing criticism of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
82.
See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Lawfor this Age of FederalSentencing: The Opportunity and Need for JudicialLawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 93 (1999) (discussing the
federal judiciary's failure to help shape federal sentencing doctrines).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151-53 (1997) (per curiam) (relying heavily on pre-Guideline jurisprudence to permit enhancements based on acquitted conduct); cf id. at
162 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that pre-guideline sentencing jurisprudence should not be
directly applied to a structure sentencing system). See generally Berman, supra note 10, at 669-79
(discussing the failure to update modem sentencing procedures in light of the new substance of
sentencing structures).
84. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).
85. See Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the FederalSystem, 43
HOus. L. REV. 341 (2006); Douglas A. Booker, Perspectiveson Booker's Potential, 18 FED. SENT'G
REP. 79, 79 (2005).
86. One of the first major circuit court decisions about Booker stressed these points, United
States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2005), and other circuit court rulings have seemed
eager to reiterate and reinforce these points. See, e.g., United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519
(5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dean,
414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11 th Cir. 2005).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1

trict courts kept on relying on uncharged conduct in calculating the (now
advisory) guideline sentencing ranges; and appellate courts kept being
primarily concerned with whether guideline ranges had been properly
calculated.87
Indeed, the post-Booker era has revealed that the legal and political
culture has made the federal sentencing system almost impervious to
dramatic doctrinal change in the status of the Guidelines. Booker's
muted impact on federal sentencing practices and outcomes highlights
that the pre-Booker legal culture acclimated case-level sentencing decision-makers-judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers-to a rule-bound sentencing process that, through judicial factfinding, resulted in significant terms of imprisonment for most federal
offenders. In addition, the pre-Booker political culture was marked by
systemwide sentencing decision-makers--Congress, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, the Department of Justice-becoming astute at enforcing
compliance with a rule-bound sentencing process. Consequently, years
after Booker, we still observe (1) a federal sentencing process that remains exceedingly focused on guideline calculations based on judicial
fact-finding, and (2) federal sentencing outcomes in which most sentences are still imposed within the (now advisory) guideline ranges and
include significant terms of imprisonment. In short, providing another
example of status quo bias in the operation of modern sentencing systems, a culture of guideline compliance has persisted after Booker.
The Rita decision enters into the post-Booker universe appearing
almost designed to preserve the status quo. As noted before, the Rita
decision approved circuit court use of a presumption of reasonableness,
but also indirectly approved of other circuits' choice not to adopt this
presumption. 88 The Rita decision encourages a statement of reasons in
support of sentencing determinations in an advisory guideline system,
but it also holds that judges need not say much when they follow the
(status quo) Guidelines and notes that judges are naturally inclined to
state reasons for their sentencing choices in any event. 89 With the Rita
decision appearing to bless the existing post-Booker universe, it is hardly
surprising that nearly every major circuit decision after Rita concludes
that the Supreme Court's work is a ratification of that circuit's pre-Rita
jurisprudence. 90
87.
See Berman, Tweaking, supra note 85; see also Neil Weinberg, Lock 'Em Up, FORBES,
Jan. 30, 2006 (noting that "not much has changed" since Booker); see generally David L. McColgin
& Brett G. Sweitzer, Grid & Bear It: Post-Booker Litigation Strategies (PartI), THE CHAMPION,
Nov. 2005, available at http://www.fd.org/pdf.lib/Grid%20Bear%20I.pdf (discussing "the early
trend toward business-as-usual sentencing after Booker").
88.
See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007).
89.
Id. at 2468-69.
90.
See, e.g., United States v. Conlan, No. 06-1510, 2007 WL 2538047, at *2 (10th Cir.
2007); United States v. Goff, No. 05-5524, 2007 WL 2445637, at *4 (3rd Cir. 2007); United States
v. Boleware, No. 06-4108, 2007 WL 2350180, at *1-2 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. D'Anico,

2007]

REASONED SENTENCING

B. The Need (and Means) to Change Sentencing Perspectives
Despite the force of status quo biases, legal and political cultures
can and do evolve. Over time, innovations and dramatic developments
that are at first resisted can become the prevailing status quo that thereafter becomes favored and defended by status quo biases. Indeed, as noted
above and as detailed more fully by others, 91 the federal judiciary's initial resistance to the Guidelines ultimately transformed into a surprising
affinity for intricate sentencing rules. An evolution in judicial personnel
and attitudes over the past two decades has resulted in many more federal
judges feeling much more comfortable handing out long sentences and
having their sentencing choices micro managed by general Guidelines
and appellate court review. Critically, though, these realities help explain not only why the Guidelines are still being embraced like a security
blanket after Booker, but also why those eager for improved federal sentencing justice should still have hope about the current development and
future status of the federal sentencing system.
To its credit, the Rita decision emphasized (though opaquely) the
importance of sentencing rulings as reasoned decisions. Disappointingly,
the decision did not rigorously question the reasoning behind the specific
Guidelines being applied to Victor Rita. Nevertheless, the ruling still
sent an important signal that district and circuit judges should-indeed,
must-explore and contemplate the reasons for specific sentencing outcomes. An emphasis on reasons and reasoning at federal sentencingespecially when combined with the Rita Court's admonition that a district court "does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the
Guidelines sentence should apply" 92-should help ensure that, over time,
the post-Booker culture of excessive guideline compliance will change
for the better.
Over time, lawyers should become more adept at emphasizing policy and case-specific reasons based on § 3553(a)'s list of factors for sentences outside the Guidelines in order to encourage judges to exercise the
expanded discretion Booker bestows. Sentencing judges should, in turn,
become more skeptical of the Guidelines' least reasoned provisions as
they become more comfortable viewing the Guidelines only as advice
and look deeper into the reasons supporting (or failing to support) the
Guidelines' recommendations. The articulation and reasoned assessment
of suggested reasons for deviating from the Guidelines can and should
provide meaningful feedback for the continuous evolution of sentencing
law and policy within the Guidelines system. Indeed, as I have stressed
Nos. 05-1468, 05-1573, 2007 WL 2253494, at *10 n.10 (lst Cir. 2007); United States v. Wachowiak, No. 06-1643, 2007 WL 2189561, at *1 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d
334, 338 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1314 n.l 1 (1 th Cir. 2007).
91.
See Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 523, 524 (2007).
92.
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
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in prior work,93 early proponents of guideline sentencing systems viewed
reasoned departures from the guidelines' suggested sentences to play a
fundamental part in a guideline system's development of purposeful and
principled sentencing law. According to these reformers, judicial articulation and review of the reasons for deviating from the guidelines would
contribute to the development of a "common law of sentencing" and
enable judges, informed by case-specific insights, to have their say
94 in the
evolution of principled and purposeful sentencing law and policy.
In order to achieve the effective and wise development of a common law of sentencing after Booker, circuit courts need to encourage
reasoned sentencing decisions by district judges and also should issue
reasonableness rulings that contribute to the reasoned development of
principled and purposeful sentencing law and policy. Unfortunately, as
noted before, many post-Booker doctrines developed by the circuit courts
have shown an affinity for the pre-Booker status quo with its inevitable
emphasis on the Guidelines rather than on the broader sentencing considerations reflected in § 3553(a)'s list of factors. Circuits have often suggested that few reasons need be given to support a within-guideline sentence, and they have also sometimes rejected as categorically inappropriate many thoughtful policy-based reasons given by district judges for
non-guideline sentences.
Though the result and some rationales in Rita may be read to support the notion that few reasons need to be given to justify a withinguideline sentence, the tone and some dicta in Rita also support the notion that sound reasons may ultimately be more important than specific
results after Booker. Further, Rita suggests that district courts can justifiably vary from the Guidelines based solely on policy disagreements
with the Guidelines. Indeed, the Government's briefs to the Supreme
Court in the Gall case indicate that it reads Rita for the proposition that
"sentencing courts may impose non-Guidelines sentences based on policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission." 95 This isan important-and very valuable-concession by the Government given that
many circuit courts have held that below-guideline sentences could not
be based solely on policy disagreements with the Guidelines. Helpfully,
the Government stresses the importance of policy-based decisions to
93.
See Berman, supra note 24.
94.
See LESLIE T. WILKINS ET AL., SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL
DISCRETION xvii (1978) (discussing value of judicial departures from the guidelines to provide "an
informational feedback loop," which "inject[s] a continuous element of self-improvement and regeneration into the guidelines"); O'DONNELL, supra note 75, at 59-60 (asserting that requiring specific
reasons for decisions to deviate from the guidelines' presumptive ranges provides "an ideally suited
institutional mechanism to upgrade-through the gradual development of case law-the rationale
and rationality of sentencing"); see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence
Appeals: A Comparison of Federaland State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1441, 1455 (1997).
95.
Brief for the United States, Gall v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2933 (2007) (No. 06-7949),
2007 WL 2406805, at *37 n. 11;see also id.at *32 ("[V]ariances need not be justified solely on
factual grounds but may... be based on reasoned policy considerations.").

2007]

REASONED SENTENCING

vary from the Guidelines being based on "reasoned policy considerations": in the Government's words, "[c]onsiderations of policy, as well as
facts, can support a variance; the test is the cogency and
strength of the
96
rationale [for a variance], not whether it is fact-based.,
In the pending Gall and Kimbrough cases, the Supreme Court
should continue to emphasize the importance of reasons and reasoning at
federal sentencing after Booker. The Court should particularly focus its
discussion and analysis on the text that Congress set forth in § 3553(a).
The statutory text of § 3553(a), which now formally governs federal sentencing, provides a useful script and virtuous agenda for reasoned postBooker sentencing decision-making. As noted before, the Court in both
Booker and Rita failed to seriously engage with the text of § 3553(a), and
this fact may in part account for the Guidelines unduly dominating postBooker sentencing practices. With the Supreme Court setting a poor
tone, many practitioners-and, in turn, many circuit and district judgeshave failed to recognize and explore the significant guidance and helpful
insights reflected in the explicit text that Congress enacted as specific
instructions to sentencing judges. Especially given that Congress has not
seen fit to alter this text in the nearly three years since Booker was decided, the Justices ought in Gall and Kimbrough to emphasize and begin
to elaborate on the centrality of this statutory text to reasoned decision
making within an advisory guideline system.
CONCLUSION

The history of modem federal sentencing reforms highlights why
evolutions in the culture surrounding federal sentencing may prove more
critical to the future of the system than any doctrinal modifications coming from Congress or the Sentencing Commission. But it also provides
an important lesson for the Supreme Court as it considers another set of
sentencing cases this coming Term.
Specifically, two forefathers of federal sentencing reform-Judge
Marvin Frankel and Professor Norval Morris-stressed the fundamental
importance of reasons in the development of any sound sentencing system. Judge Frankel closed his seminal work, Criminal Sentences: Law
Without Order,with this sentiment: "It is our duty to see that the force of
the state, when it is brought to bear through the sentences of our courts,
is exerted with the maximum we can muster of rational thought, humanity, and compassion., 97 And Professor Morris emphasized similar points
a few years later in this way: "Principled sentencing lies at the heart of
an effective criminal justice system. It is obvious that sentencing involves a heavy responsibility and raises issues of difficulty; it thus requires reasons given, critical public consideration of those reasons, criti96.
97.

Id. at *32; *8.
FRANKEL, supra note 75, at 124 (final sentence).
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cal appellate review of those reasons."98 The Justices should take these
wise sentiments to heart by emphasizing that the touchstone and hallmark of federal sentencing should be judicial exercise of reasoned sentencing judgment in response to unique case-specific factors and broader
norms set by the Constitution and Congress.

98.

Morris, supra note 75, at 275-76.

